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 1 
Introduction 
 The year 2008 marked the 30th anniversary of China’s beginning on its 
path of economic transformation. During the past three decades, a series of 
reform policies have been carried out to liberalize the economy and attract 
foreign investments. From late 1970s to 2008, China enjoyed an extensive 
period of consecutive growth with an average annual rate of 9.67%, compared 
with the world average of 3.3%. GDP per capita grew more than tenfold, from 
less than 200 dollars in 1979 to more than 3,000 dollars in 2008 (NBS). This 
economic transformation has contributed to China’s economic performance as 
well as the living standard of its population (Chow, 2007; Bhalla et al., 2003; 
Chen and Lu, 2006).  
 Such rapid economic growth was accompanied by rising inequality. The 
Gini Coefficient of China, a key indicator of overall inequality, increased from 
0.23 in 1980 to 0.47 in 2005, according to official statistics (NBS). This 
indicates that China has changed from an egalitarian economy to a more 
unequal one. This disequalizing trend coincides with the initial stage of the 
debated Kuznets curve in which inequality of income distribution first 
increases during urbanization because of the difference between returns to 
industries and agriculture; then decreases as a result of the spill-over effect of 
macroeconomic growth (Anand and Kanbur, 1993; Kuznets, 1955). In 
addition, inequality is a universal phenomenon observed in transitional 
economies such as east European countries (Milanovic, 1999) and other parts 
of the world (Sukiassyan, 2007). Given the previous central planning 
mechanism that distributes income in an egalitarian way, China’s rising 
inequality reflects the increasingly important role of market force in income 
distribution. While disparities in income due to working hour, output, and 
labor quality promote work incentives, excessive inequality harms social 
stability and has a negative impact on future progress in economics, as is the 
case with many Latin American countries (Galbraith et al., 2007).  
 Inequality in China has attracted academic attention throughout the years 
of its economic reform (Yao et al., 2005; Eastman and Lipton, 2004). 
Literature predominantly examines China’s inequality issue in two categories: 
regional (Ho and Li, 2007; Qian and Smyth, 2008) and urban-rural inequality 
(Natrajan, 2006; Li and Zahniser, 2002; Okushima and Uchimura, 2006; 
Sicular et al., 2007; Liu, 2006). These studies focus on possible causes to 
China’s rising inequality such as geographic location, biased policies, the 
housing registration system, housing reform, the introduction of labor markets, 
etc,. Among these studies, some show that the rise of overall inequality in 
China has slowed down since the second half of 1990s after a period of sharp 
increase since the reform (Gustaffson et al., 2008; Kahn and Riskin, 2008; Yue 
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et al., 2008). They conclude from empirical evidence that within-urban and 
within-rural inequality and regional inequality in the East part of China have 
been narrowed due to expanded urbanization, increased employment 
opportunities for the rural population and the trickling down effect of 
macroeconomic growth.  
These conclusions also justify the inverse Kuznets U-shaped curve of the 
inequality and development relationship. According to these studies, this 
stabilization of nation-wide income inequality verses the decreasing income 
gap of within urban and within rural inequality suggest that the urban-rural 
disparity has remained wide, if not further widened. The urban-rural income 
inequality has become a major disequalizing force that contributes to 
inequality in China. Question remains whether China’s inequality has reached 
the top of the U-curve and started the down-sloping trend of inequality or has 
yet to experience more acute inequality.    
 This paper will chiefly focus on urban-rural inequality, especially urban-
rural income inequality in China from 2002 to 2008, a recent time period that 
has been relatively less researched. It will also address emerging factors that 
can potentially reshape China’s landscape of inequality such as rural-to-urban 
migration and policy responses. The paper comprises of four sections. The 
first section introduces the economic transformation background of China’s 
rising inequality and summarizes previous literature. The second section 
utilizes empirical methods to investigate urban-rural inequality during the 
period of 2002-2008. The third section addresses emerging rural-to-urban 
migration and policy responses to the previous period of widened urban-rural 
inequality. The fourth section concludes with results and analysis and poses 
questions for future research. 
 
1. Economic Transformation and Urban-Rural Inequality 
A. Economic Transformation 
China’s Economic Transformation was initiated in 1978. Originally started 
in the agriculture sector in rural areas, reforms gradually penetrated into 
industrial sectors. Reforms later focused more on urban development. The 
transformation first took place experimentally and gained speed in the 1990s. 
These ongoing economic and political reforms significantly affected the 
urban-rural inequality via redistributive dynamics. Their influences 
transformed China from a central-planning system into a more market-oriented 
economy. 
 
Agriculture in Rural Areas 
Privatization of the rural agricultural sector spearheaded China’s 
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economic reform. The individual “household responsibility system” granted 
farmers freedom of output disposition after fulfilling a fixed quota, which 
created incentives for farmers to increase output. This incentive system 
unleashed waves of productive efficiencies that were absent from the previous 
collectivist system. The output of grain increased 33.6% from 1978 to 1984 
and reached 407.31 million tons. Because of the privatization, farmers also 
began to engage in other value-adding agricultural activities such as raising 
live-stocks and producing handcrafts to increase income. Total contribution of 
rural and agricultural reforms to rural growth during from 1978 to 1984 was a 
record 46.89 percent, reflecting the effectiveness of the central policies (Lin, 
1994). Government also increased prices for agricultural goods, which were 
compressed to finance the development of heavy industries. The policies in the 
agriculture sector boosted the rural economy and increased the incomes of 
rural residents. As a result, the urban-rural income gap dropped below 2 by 
1985 (Wang, 2008). 
 However, after 1985, the diminishing marginal return and relatively low 
productivity of agriculture became more pronounced. While rural income on 
average grew 12.6% annually from 1978 to 2007 (NBS), urban income 
increased more rapidly. The urban to rural income gap increased from 2.7 in 
1988 to 3.33 in 2007 (NBS).  
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Figure 1. Productivity of Agriculture and non-agriculture per 
capita/RMB 
 
 Confronted with rising urban-rural inequality, the Chinese State Council 
implemented further reforms. From 2004 to 2009, the State Council issued six 
annual No. 1 documents focusing on rural development to demonstrate 
strengthened efforts in increasing rural income and living standards. In the 
following years, the government invested heavily in rural infrastructures, the 
most notable of which was the Western Region Development Project aimed at 
infrastructure construction and development stimulations in the lagged-behind 
rural inland areas. In recent years, the government experimented with the 
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practice of rural resident social security in more developed rural areas. The 
government also eliminated educational surcharges for rural areas and 
provided subsidies for eligible students and promised to gradually phase out 
agricultural taxes by the end of 2009. These reforms will no doubt have a 
positive impact on China’s urban-rural inequality. 
 
Non-agriculture State-owned Sector (SOE)  
 In the early 1980s, many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) faced problems 
including failure to meet market demands, a lack of regulative supervision, 
and stagnant technology. SOEs’ losses became a big financial burden on 
government that made their reforms inevitable. Inspired by the success of the 
rural sector reforms, government introduced the contract responsibility system 
for managers of SOEs. This policy gave executives of SOEs bonus out of the 
retained profit beyond a financial target. The government also extended 
production decision-making power to the enterprise level. Firms were allowed 
to make their own decisions concerning production, supply, marketing, 
investment and pricing to encourage profit-maximization (Chow, 2007). 
However, these reforms had limited effects on SOEs. Due to institutional 
structures, managers that showed poor performance were simply transferred to 
another state-owned enterprise. Unlike the privatized agriculture sector, SOEs 
retained their state ownerships; more delegation to the enterprise did not stop 
government from intervention. Some bureaucrats were unwilling to give up 
their stake in the decision-making of SOEs due to vested interests. Many 
managers were at a loss without the directions from central government. 
Hence, new policies were resisted or carried out slowly. In 1993, the State 
Council adopted a more drastic reform. It retained 300 to 500 large state-
owned enterprises and developed them into internationally competitive firms. 
For smaller and medium size SOEs with poor performance, the State Council 
decided to sell or lease or declare them bankrupt. In 1997, the government 
extended the reforms by corporatizing the remaining large state-owned 
enterprises into shareholding companies in hope that diversified ownership 
could solve incentive problems.  
These SOE reforms had seminal influences such as the abolishment of the 
lifelong employment system in urban areas as well as increased efficiency and 
market-orientation in retained SOEs (Wu, 2005). However, reform in the state-
sectors was incomplete and limited because of deep-rooted bureaucracy, 
incapability of managers, the endogenous incentive problems of the 
enterprises, etc, (Chow, 2007; Xiong, 2007). The impact of reforms on urban-
rural income inequality lie in the shedding of surplus urban labor and 
consequent labor market restructuring in the process of privatization or 
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increasing efficiencies. Between 1995 and 2002 inclusive, no fewer than 78 
million workers were laid off (Knight and Xue, 2006). Laying off such a large 
number of wage-earners increased the urban income gap. Many workers 
bifurcated into either unemployment or wealth. Studies that used a 1999 urban 
household survey showed that most laid-off workers faced a tough and 
unfavorable labor market (Appleton et al., 2002). For the few that could take 
advantage of the burgeoning private sector, the reforms enabled them to access 
wealth and higher social status. 
 
Non-State Sector 
 Non-state enterprises are enterprises that are not subject directly to the 
central government as SOEs. They include private-enterprises, and enterprises 
with both state and non-state ownerships. Unlike their state-owned 
counterparts, non-state enterprises achieved relatively smooth and dynamic 
development since their reform. Before the late 1970s, few non-state 
enterprises existed, although they were abundant and functioned well during 
the first few years after the formation of the People’s Republic of China before 
they were converted into state-owned enterprises. After reforms and the 
gradual lifting of bans on non-state enterprises, they grew at a much faster rate 
than the state-owned enterprises (Chow, 2007; Wu, 2005). Non-state sectors 
accounted for 22.4 percent of gross industrial output in 1978, but this figure 
increased to 68.76 percent in 2006, making non-state enterprises the major 
players in China’s industry sector (NBS). In recent years, non-state enterprises 
have entered industries as wide as mining, processing of food, textile, fuels, 
and chemicals. Literature and official reports have both come to regard non-
state enterprises as driving forces of China’s economy (Claro, 2005; Lai, 2006; 
Tian, 1997).  
Among the rapidly developing non-state enterprises, the collective 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) have captured more attention (Wang 
and Davis; Biggeri et al., 1999; Wong and Mu, 1995) because of their 
collective compositions and impressive economic performance. Township and 
village enterprises were owned by the residents and local government and 
managed with the support of local authorities. Between 1978 and 1993, TVEs 
share of national industrial output expanded from 9 percent to 27 percent 
(Fang and Smith, 2008). During 1985 and 1993, TVEs created more than 54 
million jobs while state-owned enterprises started shedding workers (Biggeri 
et al., 1999). The number further increased to 134 million in 1996 (Li, 2006), 
acting as an important mechanism in reducing urban-rural inequality. In the 
late 1990s, development of TVEs went down and most were privatized in 
early 2000s. 
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Financial Sector 
Financial reform took place as early as 1979 when the loans issued by 
People’s bank replaced government subsidies (Dickie, 1981; Hemming and 
Mansoor 1988; Li and Liu, 2001). In 1985, the People’s Bank was changed to 
the Central Bank of China. Because the government maintained tight control 
of the economy, the Central bank functioned as a deposit center. The Central 
Bank of China had no authority in loan making. State-owned banks provided 
loans to loss-making state-owned enterprises in order for them to keep running 
and retain full employment. Because the performance of state-owned banks is 
closely related to the profitability of state-owned enterprises that receive the 
loans, a large amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) occurred (Santomero, 
2001) as SOEs’ performances deteriorated.  
The government intensified efforts to recapitalize non-performing loans. It 
set up a special committee to try to revamp the NPLs in order to sell them. 
However, the NPLs of state-owned banks continued to expand because the 
loss-making enterprises showed no sign of recovery. In 2002, NPLs and bad 
loans accounted for 25 to 30 percent of outstanding loans. The total value 
amounted to 4 trillion RMB, in 2004. These NPLs plague China’s banking 
system and drag China’s economic development backward because they 
deprive financial resources from other profit-making companies.  
The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges started in 1990 and 1991, 
respectively. The introduction of these two stock markets and the revitalization 
of banking sectors ushered in flows of domestic and foreign capital. This 
played an important role in the rapid growth of the Chinese economy despite 
the uneven geographic distribution of this financial capital. Market-oriented 
commercial banks also emerged during this period. 
The financial reform re-opened the stock market, extended the activities of 
China’s banks into more market-oriented financial services in addition to 
government activities. It is expected that China’s accession to WTO will speed 
up reforms in the financial sector as banks face more pressure from foreign 
competition. 
 
Foreign Investment and Trade 
Since the beginning of the economic reforms, China has gradually stepped 
out of previous autarkic self-sufficiency and become more integrated into the 
global economy, especially after its accession into the WTO in 2001. As early 
as 1980 China had established trade relations with more than 170 countries 
and regions, and had signed bilateral government trade agreements or 
protocols with more than 80 of them (NBS). Total value of imports and 
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exports grew more than 397 times from 35.5 billion RMB in 1978 to 14097.1 
billion RMB in 2006(NBS). Rapid increase in trade volume together with 
government incentive policies attracted investment inflows. 
In the 1980s, the Chinese government introduced the Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Xia’men along its eastern coasts to 
attract foreign investments. The special zones provide tax incentives for 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The SEZs also offer greater independence in 
international trade and allow partial ownership of foreign investors in 
enterprises. These favorable policies attracted waves of FDI inflows. From 
1980 to 1995, the annual growth rate of FDI in China averaged about 40%.  
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD, 2003), China became the largest recipient of FDI in the world in 
2002. Despite FDI’s positive effects in the economic growth of China, they 
almost exclusively benefited the coastal urbanities. They acted as major 
disequalizing factors in China’s urban-rural income inequality. 
 
B. Implications on Urban-Rural Inequality 
Literature indicates that China has transformed from a more egalitarian 
society to a more unequal one during its economic transformation (Yao et al; 
Bhalla et al; Eastman and Lipton). Urban-rural inequality in China not only 
includes income inequality, but also inequality in living standards such as 
infrastructure, social security, health care, and education. Market development 
and government policies are the root causes to the rising inequality of the 
above factors because of their redistributive effects. (Gao and Riskin, 2009). 
The next section analyzes the implications of market mechanisms and 
government policies on wage inequality as well as non-wage urban-rural 
income inequality in the post-transformation era. 
 
Labor Market 
The introduction of labor markets followed the reform in the state-owned 
sector. It created several redistributive dynamics in income through changed 
wage determinants. 
Unemployment is one of the direct results of a more market-oriented 
economy. Before the economic transformation, government was responsible 
for job allocation of urban workers in China. The overall labor mobility was 
extremely low. From 1995 to 2002, however, more than 78 million workers 
were laid off (Knight and Xue, 2006). Government was no longer responsible 
for ensuring full employment of laborers. Private employers determined wage 
rate and bonuses for the workers. Thus a labor market was formed in China, in 
which wages are now subject to market forces.  
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The enlarged market forces not only changed the return to labor in many 
industries, but also altered the wage determinants of the labor market. Some 
industries become more profitable than others. In mining and heavy industries 
whose wages were high before the reform, return to labor lowered on average 
20% and unemployment increased. Reforms also created new winners. Wages 
increased in burgeoning industries such as telecommunication, transportation 
and banking.  
Wage determinants such as geographic locations, economic sectors and 
type of enterprise ownerships become more influential while previously 
important factors of party membership and seniority are no longer as important 
as they were. Studies show that geographical location is the single most 
important determinant in equality. Using the Theil T decomposition of income 
inequality, location accounts for 80 to 90% of inequality, if other individual 
variables are held constant. Education also plays an increasingly important 
role in wage determination, with a contribution of 36% in 2002 (Yue et al., 
2008). This increased return to education has a positive externality on the 
development of society because people respond by increasing their investment 
in education. However, the increased weight of education in wage 
determination also enlarges the level of urban-rural inequality because 
opportunities to access education and the quality of education vary greatly 
across regions. In addition, the sizes of family and health have influences on 
wage determination. Studies also show that previously non-determinant factors 
such as gender (Li and Gustafsson, 2008; Yeuh, 2006) and ethnic minority 
(Yue et al., 2008) status now have an effect on wage differentials.   
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 The growth of foreign trade and foreign investment activities accelerated 
the economic growth of China. Not only did these activities create a myriad of 
export-led non-state enterprises, but they also created millions of job 
opportunities to accommodate these labor-intensive industries, particularly for 
the coastal urbanities. However, FDI and foreign trade aggravated the 
imbalance of regional and urban-rural development in China because of their 
disproportionate distribution. It was estimated that more than 90% of the FDI 
flowed to less than 15% of the Chinese territory. However, inflow of FDI has 
narrowed the gap among eastern regions, especially the urban-rural inequality 
(Gustafsson and Li, 2008; Xiong, 2007). This can be explained by the trickling 
down effect of economic development.  
The government has taken measures to increase infrastructure in the less-
developed inland rural areas, the most notable of which is the Western 
Development Project launched in 2000. Government also enacted incentive 
8
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policies in recent years to attract FDIs in China’s vast rural areas. It is 
expected that FDI will gradually trickle down to the rural areas because of the 
improved rural infrastructure, abundant raw material resources, favorable 
policies and lower costs of labor. 
 
Urban-biased Policies 
 China’s economic transformation was spearheaded by privatization in the 
rural sector. However, subsequent reforms focused mainly on urban areas and 
neglected the development of rural areas until recently. Urban-biased polices 
in reforms and urban-focused subsidies in the welfare system widened the 
urban-rural inequality since the 1980s. 
The urban housing reform in the mid-1990s enlarged China’s urban-rural 
gap. Prior to the reform, urban residents paid a negligible amount to rent the 
housing provided by the government while rural residents were responsible for 
their own housing. Due to maintenance burdens and loss from low rents, the 
government privatized urban housing in 1995. Urban residents were able to 
purchase their apartments at a much-lower-than-market price. Shares of urban 
owner-occupied real estate rose from 10% to 75% from the 1980s to 2000 
(Davis and Wang, 2009). Later, the booming real estate market in urban areas 
considerably added to the wealth of urban residents while it had little or no 
effect on that of rural residents whose land remained largely collectively-
owned. Due to increased wealth, urban residents had a greater opportunity to 
accumulate new financial assets than their rural counterparts (Gustafsson et 
al., 2008). The housing reform also increased the intra-urban inequality. 
 
Welfare System 
 The Chinese government has introduced many rural policies since 2004 to 
narrow the urban-rural gap. However, inequality persists in the welfare system, 
especially in healthcare, education and social security systems. 
 Education disparity has received the most attention in the literature 
because of its crucial effect on future income differentials and development 
(Qian and Smyth, 2008; Knight and Song, 2008; Gustafsson and Li, 2008). In 
2007, the central government started to eliminate tuition fees in rural areas and 
provide subsidies for eligible students. Full coverage of rural compulsory 
education narrowed the gap of urban-rural educational accessibility. However, 
the staggering disparities in the quality of education have yet to be dealt with. 
Rural schools lag behind urban ones in terms of qualification of teachers, 
conditions of schools and per student budgetary education funds (See China 
Human Development Report 07/08, p.74). Inequity in the access to college 
education is also a pronounced phenomenon that exists between the rural and 
9
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urban regions. 
 Healthcare reflects a higher level of urban-rural inequality than education 
because of the inequality in access to basic medication. The percentage of 
villages with health clinics declined until 2005 while urban medical care 
improved in quantity and quality. About 60 percent of total governmental 
spending on health flowed to the urban areas while only 40 percent reached 
the rural areas (Huang, 2003). Equipment demonstrates urban-rural disparity 
in healthcare as well. In 2006, 88 percent of the equipment of urban hospitals 
was valued above 1 million RMB while that for rural hospitals was less than 
12 percent of that amount (China Human Development Report). In 2006, the 
urban-rural healthcare expenditure ratio reached 2.59 (NBS). The gap of life 
expectancy at birth is also an indicator of China’s inequality in healthcare. 
Although the overall national longevity increased from 67.9 in 1981 to 72.4 in 
2007, the development was uneven. Counties with the highest level of 
longevity reached 80.8 years, while that of the lowest counties was only 46.0 
years (Wang and Davis, 2009). 
 Differentials in the social security system, which includes old-age 
pension, medical insurance and minimum allowance programs, also underlies 
urban-rural inequality in China. For example, the urban minimum allowance 
system started in the urban areas as early as the 1990s while it did not start in 
the rural areas until 2007 as a part of the rural development policies. 
 
Household Registration System 
The Chinese government implemented the household registration system 
in the 1950s as a central mechanism to control urban-rural migration. In this 
system, residents fall into two categories according to their place of birth: 
urban residents or rural residents. This rigid urban-rural dichotomy has long 
been regarded as a major hurdle to China’s progress to equality (Zhu, 2007). It 
grants urban residents more privileges in subsidies of housing, education, 
healthcare and pensions while rural residents live with little or no benefits, 
especially after the removal of the collective commune system in late 1970s 
that once acted as a major supplier of welfare of rural residents. Since China’s 
economic transformation, the household registration system has attracted new 
attention as a primary source of urban-rural inequality (Xie, 2000; Yang and 
Xi, 2002; Zhu, 2007). Statistically, nominal urban-rural inequality increased 
from 2.36:1 to 3.33:1 from 1978 to 2006. The urban and rural areas have 
evolved in separate trajectories of development with different administration 
and measurement of development. This urban-rural difference is testified by 
the two-tier urban-rural statistical approach of National Bureau of Statistics of 
China in conducting income surveys. In rural-to-urban migrations, the 
10
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household registration system also acts as a disequalizing factor. Due to the 
rural residential status, migrants can only obtain temporary residential 
permission in urban areas. The rural status also restricts their rights in urban 
education, healthcare, and pensions. Rural migrants are economically 
discriminated and socially excluded in the urban areas. In smaller cities, 
government has created opportunities for rural migrants to enjoy urban 
resident benefits; however, the urban-rural status dichotomy remained rigid in 
more developed coastal cities.  
The central government has made recent progress in promoting rural 
growth. It enacted a series of agriculture and rural stimulus policies in 
education, tax termination and infrastructures. The compliance and 
effectiveness of these policies in narrowing the urban-rural gap remains to be 
examined.  
 
2. Data and Definitions 
 Inequality between urban and rural areas in China exists in a various 
aspects of society such as those discussed above. Using the quantitative 
approach, income inequality is the most clear and direct reflector of the trend 
of inequality during an extended period of time. This paper analyzes income 
data of urban and rural residents, with a focus on the period from 2002 to 
2008. The data used in this study comes from China’s Statistical Yearbook 
provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. These data consists of 
the results of sample surveys, national census and government reports. It is the 
most extensive and comprehensive data resource in China. The measurements 
of development of rural and urban areas are conducted separately. 
Several studies have pointed out the limitations of the NBS database, such 
as incomplete coverage of social benefits, exclusion of imputed rental value of 
owner-occupied housing, etc (Gao and Riskin, 2009). The China Household 
Income Project (CHIP) data prepared by the China Academy of Social Science 
is another alternative. However, it is rather difficult to estimate the rental 
values of owner-occupied housing. Rental value data in CHIP are largely 
generated by estimations of owners of the housing, which invariably entitles 
subjective inaccuracies and a lack of unified standards. Other alleged 
advantages of CHIP include inclusion of urban social benefits such as 
government subsidies on food ration stamps. Since the food stamp program 
has been phased out in the 2000s, the influence of such data is negligible in 
more recent studies. Moreover, the latest CHIP data was from 2002, which is 
rather dated compared with the data available in NBS. Despite the many 
drawbacks of the NBS data, the Statistical Yearbook is the most 
comprehensive and current database with a relatively high reliability. 
11
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Therefore, I will use the NBS data in this study.  
To compare the degree of real economic wellbeing of urban and rural 
households, I use the data of annual income, annual disposable income and 
occasionally, consumption cost. Incomes are adjusted to price level of 1978 
using the CPI index to generate and compare growth rates or income levels 
during an extended period. To analyze urban-rural inequality, I compare the 
urban annual disposable income and rural net income because they reflect the 
real economic wellbeing of urban and rural households after tax. Some 
literature suggests that annual consumption data between rural and urban 
residents are better indicators of the gap since they reflect the material 
wellbeing of residents. However, consumption data is highly subjective and 
has inaccuracies that vary according to the specific samples selected. It also 
ignores the unspent income of urban and rural residents, which may underlie 
income gaps as well. It needs to be pointed out that statistics tend to 
underestimate the economic wellbeing and income of rural residents because 
many rural residents are also the major consumer of the agricultural goods that 
they produced. Due to the difficulty in estimation of these values, few data 
include value of producer-consumed goods in the rural income. 
 All income data used in this paper is presented in the per capita fashion 
according to the NBS. 
 
3. Inequality Development, 2002-2008 
During the period from 2002 to 2008, the economy grew at a high speed. 
Real income of the data period increased more than 1.5 times for both rural 
and urban residents as shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Per Capita Real Annual Income of Urban and Rural Households in 
1978 Prices (RMB) 
  Urban Rural 
2002 1621.30  785.41  
2003 1767.25  818.93  
2004 1902.58  874.97  
2005 2085.67  948.95  
2006 2303.07  1030.45  
2007 2583.55  1128.47  
2008 2800.50  1218.48  
 
In particular, the annual real income growth rate for rural residents grew 
steadily from 4.27% in 2002 to more than 8% in 2006 and 2007 (See Figure 1 
and 2). This increased speed of rural income growth may suggest that the 
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government rural development policies during the past few years have started 
to take effect. On the other hand, urban income still grew at a higher speed. 
This suggests that the real income gap between urban and rural households 
widened from 2002 to 2008.  
 Income growth rates calculated from annual income and annual 
disposable income reflect similar paths of growth throughout the years of 
analysis (See Figure 1. and Figure 2.). 
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Figure 1. Real growth rate of urban and rural annual income 
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Figure 2. Real Growth Rate of urban annual disposable income and rural net 
income 
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 However, the trend of the Gini index between differs between urban and 
rural areas during the same period (See Figure 3. and Figure 4.). From 2003 to 
2007, the urban annual disposable income and rural annual net income, which 
are the annual incomes after-tax, demonstrate a higher level of Gini coefficient 
than the annual income in the rural areas. This indicates the negative effect of 
income taxes on intra-rural income gaps because income inequality in rural 
areas higher after tax. On the other hand, tax on urban residents has a small but 
positive influence because urban income reflects more equality after tax.  
We can conclude from Figure 4 that the intra-urban income gap remains 
smaller than the intra-rural income gap in both annual income and the annual 
disposable income. This is consistent with the findings of data prior to 2002 
(Gustafsson and Li, 2008). These findings suggest that tax reforms in rural 
areas need to be carried out more speedily and thoroughly.  
 
 
Figure 3. Gini Index of Urban and Rural Annual Income, 2003-2007 
 
 
Figure 4. Gini Index of Urban and Rural Annual Disposable Income, 2003-
2007 
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Urban Inequality 
 The Gini Index results of urban income inequality during the data period 
(2002-2007) reflect a decreasing trend with a shape that demonstrates an 
inverse U curve. In the inverse U-shaped urban Gini Index figures (Figure 3 
and Figure 4), urban inequality first increased from 2002 until it reached a 
peak in 2005. After 2005, the gap has decreased steadily.  
 Examination of annual urban income growths rate between income level 
groups helps to explain this trend in urban inequality. From 2006 to 2007, the 
deciles with highest income in urban areas enjoyed the highest annual growth 
in income while the lowest income group had the smallest rate of growth from 
2002 to 2003. This means that the gap between the richest and the poorest in 
urban China further widened. However, the situation almost reversed from 
2006 to 2007. During this period, the poorest decile had not only caught up 
with the richer groups in income growth rate, but it also had the highest 
growth rates while the richest group had the smallest income growth rate. This 
translates into decreasing income inequality in the urban areas. The Kuznets 
model of inequality and development can explain this decreased inequality 
within the urban areas in recent years. Inequality first increases due to 
specialization and shifting of resources from development and later decreases 
because of the trickling-down effects of economic growth. The shape of 
Kuznets curve also coincides with that of the urban Gini curve of income. 
Whether urban China has passed the increasing part of the Kuznets inverse U-
curve needs confirmation from future data. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to 
assume from the achievements of urban economic development that the 
equalizing process has started. 
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Figure 5. Annual Urban Disposable Income Growth Rate by Income Levels in 
1978 Price (2002-2003; 2006-2007) 
 
Rural Inequality 
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 The Gini Index of rural inequality development remained relatively stable 
compared with that of the urban areas. Because there are small fluctuations 
that vary each year, the trend is hard to determine from analysis of Gini Index 
alone. Growth rates between income level groups sheds some light on the 
evolvement of rural income inequality. In Figure 6, the group with higher 
income had the higher rate of growth while groups with lower income had 
lower rate of growth. From 2002 to 2003, growth rate was negative for the 
poorest rural quintile compared with a more than 6% growth of the highest 
rural income quintile. This translates into increased rural income inequality. 
The situation changed from 2006 to 2007. During this period, the highest 
income group still had a higher income growth rate than the poorest income 
group. However, the lower-middle income quintiles started to catch up with 
the highest growth rates of more than 10% annually (Figure 6). The growth 
rates of all the income quintiles became more average as well. The growth 
rates ranged from 8% to 9.6% from 2006 to 2007 compared with -0.6% to 6% 
from 2002 to 2003. The rural income gap is still in the rising part of inverse U-
shaped Kuznets curve. Nonetheless, analysis reveals that the lower-middle 
income group has started the catching up process. Inequality in rural income 
increased at a slower speed from 2006 to 2007 than it did from 2002 to 2003. 
If the rural economy continues its rapid growth, the poorer income groups in 
rural areas may eventually catch up and surpass the richer income groups in 
annual growth rate, like their urban counterparts.  
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Figure 6. Annual Rural Net Income Growth Rate by Income Levels in 1978 
Price (2002-2003; 2006-2007) 
 
Urban-Rural Inequality 
 Between 2002 and 2008, the urban-rural real income gap increased from 
2.06 to 2.30. Analysis of urban-rural income growth suggests that this gap will 
16
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 6 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol6/iss1/10
 17 
further increase in the near future.  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 both show that the annual growth rate of urban real 
income remained higher than that of the rural income, though rural growth 
rates have started to grow closer to urban growth rate since 2005. From 2002 
to 2003, the income group with highest annual growth rate in rural areas 
experienced a growth rate of 6%. During the same period, the income group 
with the lowest level of growth rate in urban areas increased its income by 
6.6%. Urban income grew at a much higher speed than rural income for all 
income group levels. In the later data period from 2006 to 2007, rural income 
growth rates increased. However, rural income growth rate still lags behind 
that of urban areas for each income group, but the gap it has decreased.  
 
Figure 7. Engle Index of Urban and Rural Households Per Capita Annual 
Income 
 
Because of the relatively lower living costs in rural areas, real income 
may still exaggerate the real disparities between urban and rural residents. The 
Engle Index may give some insights in comparing the economic wellbeing 
between urban and rural residents. The Engle Index measures the proportion of 
income consumed in food and nutrients to measure the economic wellbeing of 
individuals and households. Higher Engle Index indicates worse economic 
wellbeing. As we can observe from Figure 7, the Engle gap between urban and 
rural residents has decreased since 2004. Food consumption in both urban and 
rural areas has occupied a smaller share of the income pie, however, that of the 
rural areas decreased at a faster speed than in urban areas. The rural to urban 
ratio of Engle Index dropped from 1.25 in 2004 to 1.19 in 2007. It needs to be 
noted that Engle Index ignores the qualitative side of food consumption. 
Urban residents on average have more choices of food. They are also likely to 
be better off than their rural counterparts in terms of nutrition intake and a 
more diversified diet. Also, the Engle Index of rural residents may not capture 
the real value of food consumption. Many of the rural households consume 
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part of their agriculture product, this is especially common in the more lagged 
behind rural areas. Since the amount of producer-consumed food consumption 
is not taken account into the Engle calculation, the Engle Index may not 
provide the most accurate indicator of rural wellbeing as well. 
 
4. Rural-to-Urban Migration and Urban-Rural Inequality 
 Rural-to-urban migration (Rural Migration) is an economic phenomenon 
of increasing importance in post-transformation China. This migration pertains 
to rural residents with registered rural household status who migrate to other 
areas, predominantly urban areas for better economic opportunities on a 
temporary or a more permanent basis. Based on official data, there were 15 
million rural migrants in 1990. By 2003, the number increased to 98 million. 
Latest statistics indicate that the number has further increased to 225.42 
million by the end of 2008. This growing rural labor force injected abundant 
productive vitality into the urban areas, in addition to facilitating the rapid 
urbanization of China. Rural-to-urban migration has led to changes in urban-
rural inequality around the world in international development (Chiswick, 
2005; de Vletter, 2007). Literature on China’s rural-to-urban migration is 
abundant. Most of these studies focused on determinants of migration (Li and 
Zahniser, 2002; Chen, 2006) and inequalities and restrictions faced by 
migrants due to their rural household registration status (Whalley and Zhang, 
2004). Discussions on the impact of migration on development of China’s 
urban-rural inequality are not only scattered and scarce but there is also a lack 
of nation-wide empirical quantification important for policy evaluations and 
policy implications. The next section will summarize the extant discussion 
with a multi-faceted approach and give suggestions for future empirical 
studies. 
 
Rural 
Rural-to-urban migration influences China’s urban-rural inequality in a 
number of ways. Remittance from rural migrants has the redistributive effect 
of increasing rural income and reducing rural poverty (Zhu and Luo, 2008). 
Influences of remittance on rural inequality are hard to determine unless 
specific data is given though remittance does increase inequality between rural 
households with migrants and rural households without migrants. Empirical 
studies based on household data needs to note that remittance cannot be 
treated as simple additions to household income because migrants would earn 
income counted as rural household income had they not migrated. An analysis 
on effects of remittance on rural household should take into account the 
possible contribution of migrants and compare the imputed result with the 
18
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after-remittance rural household data before coming to conclusion. 
 
Urban 
 Migration has a more tangible effects on urban inequality compared with 
its effects on rural inequality. Migrants face institutional and economic 
inequality in the urban areas.  
The presence of the household registration limits migrants’ access to 
education, healthcare subsidies and other welfare benefits their urban 
counterparts enjoy. Rural migrants can only live in urban areas by obtaining 
permission to live in urban areas which requires securing a job in the urban 
areas. Faced with these barriers, migrations are usually on a temporary or 
nomadic basis that lasts until the urban residence permission is expired. Even 
though there are many inequalities and inconvenience facing rural migrants, 
the number of migrants continues to increase. Studies show that migrants are 
attracted to China’s urban areas because urban jobs provide better labor 
compensations than rural jobs and marginal return to rural productivity (Li and 
Zahniser, 2002). Household registration system creates the segmented rural 
and urban labor market. By supporting barriers to migrate as mentioned above, 
it also supports the differentials of return to labor between urban and rural 
areas. Local government typically requires companies to employ workers with 
local household registration status. Because of the inequality in urban and 
rural education, most rural migrants also have less education than their urban 
counterparts.  
Hence, migrants are placed in an unfavorable employment hierarchy and 
usually assume lower-paid and more dangerous jobs that their urban 
counterparts are not willing to do. It is thus reasonable to conclude that 
migration increases urban inequality. Findings from the China Household 
Income Project also support this conclusion (Liu, 2004; Whalley and Zhang, 
2004; Li and Zahniser, 2002).  
 
Urban-Rural 
 Migration is said to be a major equalizing factor in urban-rural economic 
inequality development (Gustafsson et al., 2008). Migration relieves the rural 
areas of surplus labor, thereby increasing the productivity of the workers that 
remain in rural areas. Remittances to rural households increase rural income 
and reduce rural poverty. Migration also helps to speed up China’s 
urbanization. With an increased economic pie and pertinent rural-focused 
policies from the central government, it is reasonable to assume that migration 
will also contribute to the trickling down effect of economic benefit.  
 
19
Sun: Economic Transformation and Urban-Rural Disparity in China
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2010
 20 
Migration and Household Registration System 
Because of these positive externalities of migration, many cities in 
China have lifted certain barriers of migration. Some started to provide urban 
registration status to qualified migrants to attract more migration for future 
development (Liu, 2004). More reforms in the household registration system 
are yet on the way (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). Despite many criticisms of 
the system and its barrier to migration and possible mitigation of China’s 
widening urban-rural gap, this system is unlikely to be abolished immediately 
based on the reasons below. 
 First, the household registration system has functioned as a way of 
controlling migration in China since its initial implementation in the 1950s. 
This urban-rural separation was implemented because of the need to 
differentiate in subsidies and planning between the two areas. The urban-
biased policies and urban-biased subsidies has been eroded gradually in recent 
years, however, some of such welfare policies which requires heavy 
government funding still remains. For example, old wage pension and health 
care insurance was only recently experimented in some rural areas compared 
with a much higher coverage in urban areas. Government does not have the 
ability to afford coverage of social security system in rural areas. 
 Second, immediate removal of the household registration system will 
invariably cause an even more overwhelming number of rural migrants to 
China’s urban areas because of the urban-rural wage differentials.  However, 
existing infrastructure, housing and employment opportunities in China’s 
urban areas may not possibly accommodate migrants. International 
experiences has shown that the large number of migrants and lagged-behind 
infrastructure and employment opportunities produces slums in large cities 
including Bombay, Lagos and Karachi. While gradually lifting the migration 
barriers accompanied with increased investment in urban infrastructure 
benefits the economy, immediate removal harms such prospects. 
   
Conclusion 
 This paper provides an approach that combined the institutional and 
quantitative methods in analyzing the urban-rural inequality with a data focus 
from 2002 to 2008. For non-income inequality, I summarized the major 
reforms in China’s economy since the late 1970s and their implications on 
China’s urban-rural inequality. For income inequality, I find that from 2002 to 
2008, the urban income gap decreased, with the poorest income groups leading 
the income growth rate which indicate that the urban areas in China may have 
reached the downward part of Kuznets’ inverse U-curve. The rural income gap 
further widened from 2002 to 2008, however, the middle income group after 
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2005 showed signs of catching up. The overall urban-rural income gap 
continues to widen. It needs to be noted that rural economic well-being maybe 
heavily underestimated because many households consume the agriculture 
goods they produce. I also summarized and discussed impacts of migration, an 
increasingly prominent phenomenon, on urban-rural inequality.  
 In future research concerning income inequality in China, a number of 
topics are of pressing urgency. Income inequality and inequality in life 
opportunities in occupational status, ethnicity status, and gender have become 
more pronounced but are less researched. Inequality analysis in occupational 
status will shed some light on the identification of winners and losers during 
the reform. Analysis of inequality based on ethnicity is relevant because recent 
riots in the border areas in China which have deep and underlying roots in 
income inequality and economic opportunities. Studies in this issue are more 
pertinent if taken in a specific province with ethnic autonomy. Analysis of 
income inequality based on gender is important because gender has emerged 
in recent years as an increasingly important determinant of incomes and 
wages. There is also a lack of empirical studies that quantify the impacts of 
migration on China’s urban-rural inequality, given its utility in policy 
evaluations and implications. 
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